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In a simple open economy macromodel, calibrated to the typical institutions and 
shocks of a densely populated emerging market economy, it is shown that a monetary 
stimulus preceding a temporary supply shock can abort inflation at minimum output 
cost, since of the appreciation of exchange rates, accompanying a fall in interest rates 
and rise in output. Analytic results obtained for two periods are generalized through 
simulations and validated through estimation. The results imply that one instrument 
can, in these conditions, achieve both domestic output and exchange rate objectives, 
since it creates correct incentives for foreign exchange traders who make profits in 
supporting the policy. Such a policy response is compatible with political constraints; 
it also imparts limited volatility to the nominal exchange rate around a trend 
competitive rate, thus encouraging hedging and deepening markets. But strategic 
interactions imply the optimal policy need not be chosen; supporting institutions are 
required to coordinate monetary, fiscal policy, and markets to the optimal 
equilibrium. The analysis gives useful degrees of freedom for Asian emerging markets 
migrating to exchange rate regimes compatible with more openness. 
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The paper examines the degrees of freedom for monetary policy in a small open 
emerging market economy (SOEME). It seeks to discover the conditions under which 
monetary policy delivers both domestic cyclical and exchange rate objectives, and 
foreign exchange (FX) markets support the policy since they profit by helping deliver 
the appropriate exchange rate. The analysis is useful for Asian emerging market 
economies (EMEs) that are in the process of migrating to exchange rate regimes 
compatible with more openness.  
 
The response of monetary policy to supply shocks, and its ability to deliver the 
required exchange rate, is examined in a small open economy model
2. The latter has 
an aggregate demand function, a money demand function, a Phillips curve, and an 
interest arbitrage condition, but each component incorporates features of the EME. 
Structural features such as wage-price rigidities due to low per capita incomes and 
political interventions; high potential output due to high population density; but short-
term bottlenecks due to frequent temporary supply shocks are built in. Forward-
looking aspects come in through the exchange rate and consumer prices. Analytical 
results obtained in a simplified version with restrictions on parameters, are confirmed 
through simulations and sensitivity analysis with the full model. Estimation also 
justifies the chosen calibration. 
 
The Central Bank’s (CB’s) optimization, given the constraints from the macromodel, 
affects the decisions and payoffs of market participants and vice versa. The outcome 
can be self-enforcing under certain parameter values, which we explore by solving for 
the outcome of interaction between the central bank and the market players
3. The 
                                                           
2 New Keynesian Economics literature has developed a number of such models, where forward looking 
behavior is combined with price rigidities. Svensson (2000) was a seminal paper, even though his focus 
was on inflation targeting. The macromodel in this paper also draws on Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and 
Ghosh (2002).  
3 Forex traders are modeled following a well-developed literature, for example Bhattacharya and 
Weller (1997), Lyons (2001), and Jeanne and Rose (2002). 
  3analysis is used to construct an analytical narrative explaining actual policy choices in 
India’s post-reform period. As suggested by Bates et.al. (1998), laying out the 
assumptions and the derivations allow the logic of the argument to be critiqued; 
suitability of assumptions and the ability to validate stylized facts provide a check for 
relevance.  
 
It turns out that monetary policy can impart limited volatility to the nominal exchange 
rate by using shocks yet reducing their amplification. This makes a smoother and 
more countercyclical interest rate feasible. Intervention may not be required at all 
since markets deliver the required exchange rate. The resulting exchange rate regime 
contributes to stimulating the real sector also through encouraging trade. If deviations 
from the competitive equilibrium real exchange rate are minimized, external balance 
is maintained over the long-run. It contributes to the control of inflation by countering 
supply shocks, thus achieving a vital political goal. It encourages monetary policy to 
be forward looking rather than reactive. It also deepens and maintains stability in the 
FX market.  
 
Full floating results in excessive volatility in immature markets with large foreign 
inflows, but some flexibility may moderate volatility. FX markets have a tendency 
towards excessive movement, as market participants tend to follow each other. 
Hedging removes the effect of currency movement in any one direction on profits by 
creating exposure in the opposite direction. Limited two-way movement improves 
incentives for hedging and therefore reduces currency risk. Since the number of 
agents whom a change in the nominal exchange rate affects falls, market stability 
rises. No hedge can cover a currency crisis, but random small movements reduce one-
way bets that could otherwise magnify the movements, as happened during the East 
Asian crises when exchange rates were largely fixed. Currency risk aggravates 
systemic, liquidity and credit risk in thin EME financial markets. Global and regional 
measures are also required to reduce these risks, but this paper brings out the 
contribution of exchange rate regimes. 
 
Under large capital inflows, facing fast growing EMEs today, accumulation of 
reserves and aggressive sterilization can prevent exchange rate appreciation, but 
interest rates rise. In the simple Mundell-Fleming (M-F) model this implies further 
  4inflows. Monetary policy looses its independence being tied to maintaining the fixed 
exchange rate. The cycle can end in a crisis with a reversal of inflows and a collapse 
of the exchange rate. A restrictive macroeconomic policy response may harm the real 
sector and lead to the reversal it fears. But over appreciation of the exchange rate can 
harm trade, and intervention without full sterilization can cause a damaging over-
expansion of the money supply, which again raises interest rates because of expected 
inflation. Monetary policy has to find a fine balance.  
 
It turns out that some of the ways such an EME’s structure differs from the prototype 
M-F model give degrees of freedom for monetary policy, despite large capital flows. 
The policy combination will be credible only if it improves real fundamentals in the 
economy. It will do this sine the variation in the exchange rate allows interest rates to 
respond to the domestic cycle and reduces the impact of import price shocks on 
inflation. Since inflation is a very sensitive political issue, this will enhance the 
political feasibility of the policy. Inflation has been controlled in ways that have 
imposed large distortions and costs on society. So an exchange rate regime suited to 
structure and rigidities can reduce this waste and improve coordination, thus helping 
resolve a collective action problem to release potential surplus. 
 
Section 2 presents the model, theoretical results, and empirical validation through 
regressions and simulations. Section 3 applies it to explain policy choices and 




2 The Model 
A standard open economy IS-LM-UIP (uncovered interest parity) model is adapted by 
building in the dualistic labor market, specific wage-price rigidities, the typical 
structure of shocks, and a simple FX market. 
 
  52.1. A Macro Structural Model of a Small Open Economy 
The building blocks of the model are first, an aggregate demand equation where 
output, yt, responds positively to the real exchange rate and negatively to the real 
interest rate. All variables are expressed as log-linearized deviations from a mean. 
( ) ( ) ( ) t
e
t t t t t t p p i p p e y − − − − + = +1
* σ δ      (1) 
The nominal exchange rate et is measured in units of foreign currency so that a rise 
implies a depreciation of the home currency. Since pt denotes home country prices 






t p p − +1  subtracted from the nominal interest rate gives the real 
interest rate in the second bracket. Money market equilibrium gives: 
t t t t t v i y p m − − = − φ α        ( 2 )  
Since the money supply is assumed to target interest rates, vt is the composite demand 
shock plus money supply response. A rise in vt will reduce it. 
  
Even without full capital account convertibility, mobile capital flows are assumed to 
be large enough to equate expected returns from deposits in domestic currency, to 
those from deposits in foreign currency plus country risk. Since capital account 
convertibility is limited
4, domestic residents cannot hold foreign bonds and sovereign 
bonds are not floated internationally. Therefore the share of foreign bonds in 
portfolios does not determine the risk premium, which depends on an exogenous 
country risk plus FX traders’ risk
5, derived to be negatively related to the variance of 
exchange rates in section 3.4 below. With the foreign interest rate normalized to zero, 
arbitrage implies that expected depreciation of the exchange rate plus the risk 
premium ρt, must equal the interest differential: 
t t
e
t t e e i ρ + − = +1         ( 3 )  
 
On the supply side, producer prices are marked up on wages, so producer price 
inflation responds to nominal wage inflation, lagged output (through pro-cyclical 
mark-ups) and contemporaneous oil (ηt+1) or productivity (gt+1) shocks to supply: 
                                                           
4 This is true of both India and China. 
5 BIS forex market data shows that traders dominate forex transactions. Transactions due to trade or 
investment are a very small percentage of more than dollar trillion forex transactions. Goyal (2005) 
shows that the latter are much lower in EMEs compared to developed countries, but are growing 
rapidly. 
  6  ( ) 1 1 1 1 + + + + + − + − = − t t t t t t t g y w w p p η ψ                 
(4) 
The consumer price index, , is a weighted average of home and foreign prices. 






t p t: 
          ( 5 )   () t t
c
t e p p λ λ − + = 1
Nominal wages respond to lagged inflation in consumer prices so, w t = .  This 
feature follows from characteristics of a dualistic labor market where wages may not 
be indexed to inflation but the low wage level is highly sensitive to food price 
inflation
c
t p 1 −
6. Substituting out wages from equation (4) and assuming that productivity is 
not changing gives:  




t t t y p p p p η ψ                                                          (6) 
With trade liberalization food prices become more closely linked to border prices and 
the weight of et in equation (5) rises;   responds to e
c
t p t; wages respond to ; and 




there is an adverse supply shock ηt+1. The effect of border prices in stabilizing food 
prices, allows a potential escape from the inflation cum subsidy trap.  
 
The dualistic labor market structure implies that if food prices are stable, supply is 
elastic since output is below the potential that absorbs the labor slack
7. If capital is 
available, specific bottlenecks are alleviated and institutional reforms undertaken 
shocks to which the supply curve is subject can also be reduced. Foreign inflows 
relieve constraints on imports of food stocks, fuel oils and capital goods
8. Moreover 
new technology makes it possible to bypass some deficiencies in infrastructure while 
                                                           
6 Since there is no cost of living indexation in the large informal Indian labor market (accounting for 80 
percent of the work force) nominal wage adjustment is lagged. There are political pressures to keep real 
wages fixed in terms of food; and pressures from well organized rural lobbies (the share of  the rural 
population still exceeds 70 percent) for high and rising farm support prices. The compromise has been 
to subsidize both farmers and consumers; the latter through a low price public distribution system. 
Since the latter is not very effective, protection is not complete, and nominal wages rise with a lag in 
response to a rise in food prices. 
7 The Planning Commission (2006, pp.77), India, estimates that 35 million are unemployed and the 
labor force will increase by 52-65 million over the next five years because of population growth and 
more female labour force participation. 
8 Stable inflows tend to dominate in labour surplus EMEs. They may even relieve India’s pressing 
infrastructure needs. The Indian Government is trying to find innovative ways to use forex reserves to 
raise spending on infrastructure, motivated by the Chinese Government’s successful large spending in 
this area. The inability of the private sector to build infrastructure despite inducements has led to an 
emphasis on public private partnerships. 
  7easier availability of finance funds its expansion in EMEs. Reduction in bureaucratic 
rationing and continuing reforms remove rigidities, shorten lags and delays, making 
supply more elastic. Since the real consumption wage in the informal labour market is 
around subsistence, firms do not gain from lowering it, since the latter makes 
productivity fall. The availability of labor implies that, in the short-run and over a 
horizon exceeding one year, which is long enough for the capital stock to rise, mean 
output  y  would lie below potential output y ; there are constant returns to capital
9.  In 
the short run we consider in the model, if food prices are constant labor cost does not 
rise; if there is no cost shock, intermediate inputs prices also do not rise; if mark-ups 




The effect of money supply on prices comes in through the money market equation 
(2). An excessive rise in money supply is inflationary, if short-run capacity constraints 
are reached but not if cost shocks have the dominant effect on prices in the short-run. 
To the extent money demand becomes unstable with development, money supply has 
to respond more frequently in order to prevent large fluctuations in interest rates, but 
the equilibrium condition (2) must continue to hold. Since the policy instrument may 
be a short interest rate, money supply mt can be normalized to zero.  
 
The structure of the EME and its typical shocks allow simplifying assumptions 
required to derive analytical results. These are relaxed in simulations later. If dualism 
and rigidities lower the response to price variables in an EME, price elasticities such 
                                                           
9 Aghion et. al. (1999) derive this in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function 
β β − =
1 L AK Y  
where Y is the output level, K the capital stock, L labor employed. Normalizing the constant 
consumption wage  1 =
c
t P W  (where W is the nominal wage and P the price level) and equating it to 
the marginal product of labor gives a value for L, which when substituted in the production function 
gives  () ()
() K K A B A Y τ
β β = − =
− 1 1  or the standard AK production function with CRS. Despite 
rapid growth in India since the late nineties, NSS earnings data show almost constant real wage rates 
over 1999-2000; only graduates and above saw a sizeable rise in earnings (Planning Commission, 
2006, pp. 76-77).    
10 Reforms allow faster labor absorption and an upward trend in mean output. Capital accumulation and 
organizational change over time will raise labor productivity, and increasing competition through 
opening out will reduce mark-ups. These factors will tend to further reduce inflation until the economy 
reaches a mature steady state. We abstract from them in order to simplify the analysis, but these factors 
further support the results. 
  8as δ, σ may be low. But they would rise with reform
11. Constant mark-ups and CRS 
imply that 0 ~ ψ , and the large weight of food in   implies that λ is also low. If 
policy successfully implements limited volatility of the real exchange rate and induces 
hedging against small variations so that the exchange rate does not have a major 
impact on trade, we can assume δ = 0. The first term or the real exchange rate drops 
out of equation (1). We assume country risk is constant, and that the central bank 
credibly commits to limiting the variance of the exchange rate, so that the risk 
premium is low. Some exchange rate variability induces hedging and reduces the 
impact of shocks that raise the risk premium. In the analytical derivation we restrict 
the horizon to 3 periods (a simulation establishes similar results for n periods). All 
agents including the CB have a three period horizon. No trade occurs in the FX 
market in period 3 since the exchange rate has stabilized. Predetermined variables are 
set to zero, so . All exogenous foreign price variables are also taken to be 
zero. To model the frequency of supply shocks in an EME, we consider the case of 
the period 1 monetary policy variable v
c
t P
0 1 = = p p
c
o
1 responding to an expected supply shock in 
period 2, η2. As a result it is possible to set v2 = 0 and η1 = 0. We drop ρ from the 
arbitrage equation since the risk premium is assumed not to change. 
 
The CB has prior knowledge of the supply shock from its close following of trends 
and understanding of economic structure. In period 1 it learns that an adverse supply 
shock will impact the economy in period 2 (for example, a poor harvest due to a 
failure of rains). It responds by lowering interest rates (raising v1) in period 1. It is 
fully transparent and announces both the expected shock and its action. 
 
Agents anticipate future prices and exchange rates and understand the CB’s objective 
function. Expectations are model consistent and are realized in equilibrium. Therefore 
equilibrium values can be derived by the method of backward induction, starting with 
period 2 variables. 
 
                                                           
11 Ghosh (2002) estimates δ =0.114, σ = 0.152, α = 0.225 and φ = 1.420, for the US and OECD 
countries. Cavoli and Rajan (2004) estimate δ =- 0.09, σ = 0.36 for Thailand. Thus trade effects are 
small and of the wrong sign, and interest elasticity is large. Estimates of aggregate demand and supply 
functions for India, with monthly and quarterly data for the period after 1995, show δ to be 
insignificant, while σ is large and significant. Aggregate supply shows negative effects of excess 
capacity and positive impact of external prices on WPI inflation (see section 3.3).  
  9The assumptions made give   since e
c p p e i 1 2 2 2 , = − = 3 = 0 because of mean reversion 
in exchange rates and p1 = 0. Also using equations (1) to (5) we can solve for y2 and 




















y       ( 8 )  
Reverting to period 1, the aggregate demand function reduces to: 
[ ]
e p i y 2 1 1 − − = σ       ( 9 )  
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− =       ( 1 1 )  
Price dynamics from the Phillips curve, remembering  give:  0 1 = = p p
c
o
( ) 2 1 1 2 1 η ψ λ + + − = y e p                                                 (12) 
Since  0 ~ λ  and  0 ~ ψ , equation (12) simplifies further to p2 = e1 + η1. Substituting for 
e1 and y1 and imposing the condition that   and   so that expectations 
are realized gives: 
2 2 e e
e = 2 2 p p
e =
() ( ) ( )
() () ασ φ ασ φ φ
φ ασ η ασ φ φ ασ
+ + + +






p     (13) 
Substituting (13) in the equations for e1 and y1 allows us to solve for these variables as 
functions of the exogenous parameters and shocks. Calling the denominator of 
Equation (13) φD, y1 can be written as: 
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Equation (15) implies that 









































From equations (10) a net fall in i1 requires v1 to exceed αy1 and from equation (11) 
this implies an expected appreciation of e2. The condition for e2 to actually appreciate 
ασ <1 is also required for v1 to rise (Appendix I). The interest elasticity of output and 
income elasticity of money demand must not be too large. Estimated parameters 
satisfy these conditions. The response of p2, e2 and y2 to the shocks can be readily 
derived from equations (13), (7) and (8). The signs are collected in Table 1. 
  
The results imply that an anticipatory policy response (v1) to a supply shock η2 that 
lowers period 1 interest rates would raise y1, appreciate exchange rates in both 
periods, thus lowering , and moderating the rise p
c p1
c p2 2 and fall in y2 due to this rise. 
The policy takes advantage of lags in pricing to neutralize the effect of the supply 
shock on consumer price inflation, thus lowering the output cost of inflation targeting. 
In period 2 interest rates rise to cover the expected depreciation required for mean 
reversion. The nominal appreciation in the exchange rate is what counters the effect of 
the supply shock on inflation. The exchange rate appreciates despite the rise in money 
supply because the rise in y raises money demand. The anticipated rise in p2 together 
with the fall in i1 lowers the real interest rate and stimulates y1, but the rise in p2 is 
itself moderated by the anticipated appreciation.  
 
Table 1: Response of variables to shocks 
         Variables 
Shocks 
p2 e1 =
c p1 y1 e2 =  
c p2 y2 i1 i2 =   
-e2
v1 + -  +  -  -  -  + 
η2 + -  +  -  -  + + 
 
It is possible to extend the results to explore how outcomes are affected if the CB does 
not fully share its prior information on η2 with the public in period 1. Then period 2 
inflation may not be fully expected. But sharing information will benefit the CB if 
expected period 2 inflation lowers the real interest rate and stimulates output. 
  11Expected inflation rises because producer prices adjust only with a lag. The CB does 
not have an inflation bias because in the labor market structure postulated, a surprise 
fall in real wages lowers labor productivity and therefore does not lead to a rise in 
labor demand and output. Moreover, in a low per capita income EME, inflation is a 
sensitive political issue. So the CB is strongly motivated to keep inflation low. All this 
implies that the full information equilibrium is sub game perfect, optimal and 
credible, with the private sectors’ expectations of inflation fully realized. 
 
The output cost is low for this strategy of inflation reduction since appreciation will 
shift down the supply curve reducing inflation, and the rise in demand will raise 
output, for the combination of shocks v1 and η2. Interest rates rise in period 2 to cover 
the expected depreciation of the exchange rate back to its equilibrium value, thus 
negatively impacting period 2 output. But this effect will be lowered to the extent the 
equilibrium exchange rate itself appreciates, and the CB tends to smooth interest rates. 
The latter allows a small change in interest rates to have a large impact as forward 
looking agents factor in future movements in the same direction.   
 
It also helps achieve one of the aims of reform to bring down the large gap that exists 
between domestic and world interest rates, since CBs worldwide tend to smooth 
interest rates. The interest gap can be further factored as * i i i i − + − , with average 
domestic interest rates exceeding international. Exchange rate policy can contribute to 
shrinking the latter gap. When the economy reaches maturity i would be tied down by 
world inflation and real interest rate.  
 
We put lowering the interest differential in the CB’s objective function to capture its 
aim of reducing the deviation of output below potential, and smoothing interest rates. 
Inflation also reduces the CB’s utility, U, and the weight w, on the loss due to 








+ − − = ∑
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As w rises the objective function reduces to the pure domestic inflation targeting case. 
Inserting equilibrium values of the variables in the CB’s objective function and 
differentiating with reference to v1, gives the optimal value v*1 of the policy variable 
  12v1 (See appendix I). The optimum  rises with η2  and falls with w, the weight on 
inflation in the CB’s loss function
12. A rise in v1 to v*1 lowers the CB’s loss, or 
increase its welfare. 
 
2.2. Simulations 
Simulations allow us to get results with the full optimization model
13, without 
imposing any zero restrictions. They also allow us to move away from the assumption 
of only 3 periods. The results are similar to those from the analytical derivations 
documented in Table 1, but with more smoothing over time. Sensitivity analysis 
makes it possible to calibrate to benchmark parameter values, which turn out to be 
close to estimated values for India (section 3.3) and for Asian EMEs (see footnote11).  
 
The simulations are run for 12 periods with equal unit weights put on the variables in 
the loss function which are taken as p and y. Nine of the simulations (g1 to g9) are 
reported in Charts 1 and 2.   
 
Each row in the charts reports the optimal response of p, p
c, y, e and v respectively to 
a period one shock. Since the variables are measured in log deviations from steady 
state values, a shock leads to a diversion from zero with adjustment back towards 
equilibrium over time. In Chart 1 the range of variation on the y-axis is –0.2 to 0.2, 
and in Chart 2 –0.1 to 0.1. For the first eight simulations, the shock is a cost shock η1, 
and for the last simulation, it is a positive demand shock to y. Benchmark values 
resulting from the sensitivity analysis are α = 1; σ = 0.4; φ = 0.6; λ = 0.5; ψ = 0.1; θ = 
0.1; δ = 0.1; and the variance of the period 1 shock is taken to be 0.1
2. The parameter 
θ picks up the effect of lagged output on producer prices p in equation 4. Since v now 
adjusts gradually over the 12 periods the responses of the other variables are also 
smoothed over this period. 
 
                                                           
12 Substituting η
e
2=θ η2 in the CB’s loss function, where θ is the information disclosure, differentiating 
with respect to θ gives the solution for θ* or the optimal degree of information disclosure, although we 
are abstracting from this by assuming full information disclosure. θ* falls with η2 and rises with vI . 
13 The simulations modified a GAUSS code for solving for optimal monetary policy under discretion, 
made available by Paul Soderlind on his website 
http://home.tiscalinet.ch/paulsoderlind.  I thank Ramkishen Rajan and Tony 
Cavoli for suggesting this code.  
  13Chart 1, in g1 (row 1), ψ and δ are 0 as in the analytical derivations. The basic pattern 
of a price shock leading to a rise in v, appreciation, fall in p
c, rise and then reversion 
in y and p is established. After the initial jump away from zero, and some adjustments 
in the early periods there is not much change over the course of the 12 period 
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Chart 1: Impulse responses (simulations g1 to g4)  
Each row except the last (g9) reports the effect of a period one cost shock of size 0.1
2 on p, p
c, y, e and 
v. In g1 (row 1) the parameter values are α = 1; σ = 0.6; φ = 0.6; λ = 0.5; ψ = 0; δ = 0. In g2 (row 2) the 
changes are ψ = 0.1; δ = 0.1; g3 (row 3) changes δ to 0.3, other parameters as in g2; g4 (row 4) has ψ = 
0.2; δ = 0.1. 
  
In g2 (row 2), positive coefficients for ψ and δ moderate the rise in v, and the 
resulting appreciation. The rise in y and fall in p
c is less, and p rises more in the first 
few periods and then rises less. For all variables there is more change during the 
period of the simulation, and mean reversion is established. But the basic pattern 
remains intact in the more general model. The results are sensitive to the elasticity of 
export demand. In g3 (row 3), as δ is raised to 0.2, the pattern changes. There is a fall 
in v, a smaller appreciation, fall in y, rise in both p and p
c in response to a cost shock. 
  14But estimation rarely finds δ to exceed 0.1, and for δ = 0.1 the basic pattern continues 
to hold. 
 
A higher effect of y on p, or a rise in ψ and θ to 0.2 in g4 (row 4), leads to a smaller 
rise in v, a smaller appreciation, a small fall in y, p
c now remains positive through out, 
while p is first higher and then lower compared to the benchmark. 
 
In Chart 2, g5 (row 1), a fall in the interest elasticity of aggregate demand σ by 0.2 to 
0.4 makes v rise slightly less initially and then slightly more, with appreciation 
echoing this pattern. The rise in y is less; p
c is less negative, and p higher. Since the 
value of 0.4 is closer to empirical estimations we take this as our benchmark. The 
basic pattern of response to a cost shock, including initial appreciation followed by 
depreciation, continues to be the same. 
 
The results are not sensitive to changes in the parameters of the money demand 
function, since v adjusts fully to compensate. Row 2 (g6) and 3 (g7) show the results 
of a change in the interest elasticity of money demand, φ, first to 0.4 and then to 0.7. 
If φ is lower, v has to rise more and is equally effective. 
 
A simulation with no cost shock and a positive demand shock to output of standard 
deviation 0.1, (g9, row 5) leads to a fall in money supply leading to a fall in output 
after the period 1 rise. The exchange rate now depreciates; p
c is positive, and p 
negative. The pattern of response of variables is now different.  
 
We can safely conclude a rise in money supply, after a supply shock, minimizes the 
CB’s loss function. It leads to an appreciation, which lowers prices, while output rises 
initially. Mean reversion occurs gradually. 
 
But CBs are worried about overreaction in foreign exchange markets affecting 
exchange rates. Therefore we analyze the response of FX traders to such a policy 
package in section 3.4, after seeing how far estimation with Indian data supports 
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Chart 2: Impulse responses contd. (simulations g5 to g9)  
g5 (row 1) is the benchmark for all the simulations in this figure. The parameter values are α = 1; σ = 
0.4; φ = 0.6; λ = 0.5; ψ = 0.1; δ = 0.1. The change here is a lower σ.  In g6 (row 2), φ is reduced to 0.4. 
In g7 (row 3), φ is increased to 0.7; g7 changes δ to 0.3, with other parameters as in g6. In g8 (row4) δ 
= 0.2; g9 (row 5) has a positive output shock of variance 0.1




Estimation of aggregate demand and supply for India are reported in Table 2. The data 
is for the period 1995-2004, sourced from the IFS (IMF) and RBI (www.rbi.org.in). 
All variables are transformed as changes in log values, except interest rates, and are 
all stationary. Unit root tests are reported in tables 3 and 4 in appendix II. 
 
Parsimonious specifications as close as possible to the theoretical specifications are 
estimated with both monthly and quarterly data. Given this the R-squared, F and t 
statistics are good. To estimate aggregate supply, the log change in wholesale prices 
  16dwpi_t is regressed on log-lagged change in the consumer price index dcpi_t_2, US 
consumer price index duscpi, oil prices doil, a measure of potential output diippot, 
and a constant term, using monthly data.  
Table 2: Aggregate Demand and Supply in the Indian Economy 
  AGGREGATE DEMAND  AGGREGATE SUPPLY 
 MONTHLY    QUARTERLY  MONTHLY  QUARTERLY 
 diip_t  dip_t  dwpi_t  dwpi_t 
diip_t_l -0.496****(-5.88) -0.362*** (-2.32)     --     -- 
Cmr 1.464* (1.42)  -1.058*** (-2.26)      --      -- 
dz_t_l  -0.583  (-0.02)  -0.336  (-1.07)     --     -- 
dreallr 1.39**** (2.67)  --      --      -- 
dwpi_t -0.963* (-1.36)  -1.396* (-1.48)     --     -- 
constant  -.744 (-0.73)  .025 (1.15)  0.161**(1.81) -.004  (0.45) 
realcmrqr    --  1.099***(2.33)      --      -- 
dcpi_t_2     --     --  0.403**(1.85) -0.138** (-1.80)   
diippot      --      --  -0.025***(2.24)     -- 
doil     --     --  -0.013**(-1.90)      -- 
duscpi      --      --  1.026****(4.34)      -- 
dgdpq_pot      -0.025** (-1.95) 
No. of obs  115  37  115  36 
F(5,109)  9.58    --    --  -- 
F(5,31)    5.94    --   -- 
F(4,110)    --   --  7.52  -- 
F(2,33)    --   --    --  4.49 
Prob>F 0.00  0.0006  0.00  0.0189 
R-squared  0.3053 0.4894 0.2147  0.2139 
Adj.R-squared  0.2734 0.4070 0.1861  0.1662 
Root  MSE  4.0214 .03993 .55484  .00832 
Note: t statistics in brackets; ****,***,**,* indicate 1%, 2.5 %, 5%, 10% significance levels 
respectively 
For quarterly data the potential output variable, dgdpq_pot, is based on gross domestic 
output, for which data is available on a quarterly basis, rather than the index of 
industrial production used with monthly data. Since there are only 36 observations 
with quarterly data, insignificant variables are dropped so that the F statistic and the 
overall regression are significant. To estimate aggregate demand log change in 
  17industrial production, diip_t, is regressed on its own lagged value, diip_t_1, the log 
change in wholesale prices, dwpi_t, the call money rate, cmr, the real long-run loan 
interest rate, reallr, or the realcmr for quarterly data, one period lagged real 
depreciation dz_t_1, and a constant term. 
 
Results are similar for both data sets. They validate the assumptions made in the 
theoretical section.  Interest rate elasticity of output demand is high and real 
depreciation does not significantly affect output demand. Since India’s prices and 
interest rates are still administered to some extent the real long rate has a positive 
coefficient, while that on inflation is negative. This suggests that inflation is largely 
due to cost-push factors and has a negative effect on demand. Since long nominal 
rates do not adjust rapidly, real interest rates are low when inflation is high and 
demand is low, explaining the positive coefficient on real rates. Potential output has 
significant negative coefficient in both the estimated aggregate supply, suggesting that 
excess capacity made supply elastic in this period. Aggregate supply curve shows the 
effect of lagged consumer prices on wholesale price inflation, with some evidence of 
mean reversion in the quarterly estimate. Nominal exchange rates are not significant 
but may be affecting prices through the lagged CPI. Other external prices have a 
direct impact. 
 
Table 3: GMM Estimation, Aggregate Supply (monthly) with Forward-Looking 
Variables 
  dcpi_t-1 dwpi_t-1 
constant -0.48  (-0.51)  0.46****(3.99) 
dcpi_t  0.67****(5.57)      -- 
dcpi_t-2  0.36 ****(4.13)      -- 
dz_t-1  -16.83 ****(-2.87)      -- 
dwpi_t         --  -0.08 (-0.43) 
dcpi_t-4         --  -0.12*(-1.50) 
doil_t-2         --  0.02****(3.00) 
dprod_t-1         --  -0.02***(-2.15) 
No. of Observations  113  111 
F(3,109)  36.21      -- 
F(4,106)     --  4.43 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00 
Centered R
2 0.32 0.11 
Uncentered R
2 0.48 0.38 
Hansen J statistic  7.52  11.44 
Note: t statistics in brackets; ****,***,**,* indicate 1%, 2.5 %, 5%, 10% significance levels 
respectively 
  18GMM estimates of monthly aggregate supply reported in Table 3, with forward-
looking variables, instrumented with a large number of lagged variables, confirm the 
above picture. They clearly show that while consumer prices are forward-looking, 
producer or wholesale prices are not as modeled in section 2. External prices and 
improvements in productivity impact inflation from the supply-side. 
 
2.4. FX traders and strategic interaction with the Central Bank 
FX traders arbitrage across currencies in response to expected profits. This can cause 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. Will supporting a transparent exchange rate 
objective of the CB be profitable for traders, after an announced policy response to a 
supply shock? A trader’s utility is a negative exponential of wealth W, with θ as the 
constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Their wealth is derived from trading 
profit and is normally distributed: 
() ( ) W W u θ − − = exp       ( 1 6 )  
It follows that their preferences, or the objective function, they maximize for period 1, 
can be represented as a simple function of the mean and variance of trading profit. 
[ ] ()
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   (17) 
Trading profits are given by the quantity transacted into the expected change in the 













=                                                           (18) 
Thus risk aversion implies that net demand is an inelastic function the expected 
change in the exchange rate in that period. It rises with expected appreciation and falls 
with expected depreciation, and with the variance of the exchange rate. It is lower if θ 
is high. Summing over i traders of measure unity gives total market net demand D(e1) 
in period 1. 
          ( 1 9 )   () ( ) ∫ =
1
1 1 , di i e D e D
0
  19Markets must clear in equilibrium so that net demand equals net supply: 
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Traders expect to profit from the appreciation in period 2, which will occur if optimal 
monetary policy is chosen in response to the expected supply shock. Net demand for 
the home currency rises in period 1 and causes the expected appreciation, even 
without CB intervention in FX markets. Similarly expected appreciation in period 1 
(equation 15) will raise net demand in period zero and cause the appreciation. Some 
traders who need to unwind their positions in order to rebalance portfolios will sell as 
the majority buy. Net sales in the next period will cause the expected reversion of the 
exchange rate to its mean value. If risk aversion is lower, the response will be more 
elastic. 


























Since other periods can be analyzed similarly we focus on the expected period 1 















Figure 1: Payoffs to the CB and forex traders (F) under 
alternative strategy combinations 
  20p2 in the CB and trader objective functions. From (19) the trader’s optimal response to 
the CB’s optimal policy v*1 in response to a supply shock η2, is net buying (B). Since 
both the CB and FX traders are maximizing their objective functions, payoffs are 
highest in the strategy (v*1, B) shown as (10,10) in Figure 1. It is the unique sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium. Figure 1 also shows the payoffs to all other strategy 
combinations. If traders sell when the CB plays v*1 they have negative returns as the 
currency appreciates. The CB also incurs some cost from successful intervention so 
the payoffs to (v*1, S) are (7, -3). The other strategies available to the CB are to 
respond to η2 by increasing v1 above v*1 to vH or decreasing it below v*1 to vL. In each 
case FX traders decide whether to turn net buyers (B) or sellers (S) of the currency. 
From Table 10, if v1 is decreased, output will fall, the interest rate will rise, and the 
exchange rate will depreciate. The CB’s payoffs will fall, and dealers will gain more 
from a sell strategy compared to a buy strategy. This explains the payoffs in the 
central section (2) of Figure 1. 
 
However, over expansion of the money supply is possible if v1 is increased too much 
above  v*1. If output is near full capacity, there is a large revenue deficit already 
boosting demand, the interest elasticities σ, φ are low, and the response of prices to 
output ψ is high even a small rise in v1 may raise it much above v*1. An attempt to 
lower interest rates would then raise inflationary expectations and result in sharp 
exchange rate depreciation, which may breach the variance bound making a defensive 
rise in interest rates necessary. The payoffs are lowest in this case (section 3, Figure 
1). 
 
Traders are willing to support the policy combination 1, delivering the appreciation 
required to moderate the supply shock. They act against policy in 2 and 3, enhancing 
volatility. Even so, the policy combination 2 of Figure 1 is most often found in 
practice. Conservative CBs prefer median low risk payoffs, especially when 
uncertainties are high, or there is fiscal fragility. If the EME is a democracy with low 
per capita income, even if the CB is not independent, the government will impose 
conservative inflation preferences.  Or the Government may alternate between 1 and 3 
  21or 1 and 2. Uncertainty in payoffs can lead to use of mixed strategies
14. But then the 
CBs experience will be that markets create volatility, and it is necessary to intervene 
and otherwise repress markets. FX players will follow a maximin strategy in response 
to the CB who is the first mover. That is, they will pick the strategy that gives them 
the highest possible payoff given that the CB’s strategy makes F’s payoffs as low as 
possible.      
 
The CB only has to announce that it stands ready to limit exchange rate variance 
within bounds, then if it implements optimal v*1 it will be able to target the interest 
rate to the domestic cycle and counter supply shocks such as η. Operating one 
instrument v achieves desired movements in i, e, y and p.  The CB may not need to 
intervene in FX markets at all. Intervention or signaling may be required only if the 
variance of e exceeds the bounds set. In thin markets and with high reserves, CB 
actions can be highly effective.  
FX markets have a combination of informed traders who know the fundamentals, and 
noise traders who make systematic errors and try to derive information by observing 
market price and the activity of informed traders. While fundamentals based trade 
leads to stable mean reversion, noise traders can cause excess volatility. But the FX 
market differs from other markets because the CB is the largest trader. If it sets 
bounds on the exchange rate to limit variance, it will be sufficient keep away noise 
traders and prevent explosive one-way movements. Credible bounds on the variance 
also lower risk so that trader demand becomes a more elastic function of expected 
change in the exchange rate. The bounded variance will lower returns to and attract 
fewer such noise traders (Jeanne and Rose, 2002).  
The choice between signaling and intervention is also linked to that on transparency. 
If the CB does not want to announce its policy response or an explicit exchange rate 
target, it can allow traders to infer the direction of CB actions. This will take time, so 
that changes will be slower. The risk of over-shooting is reduced, but the CB has to 
put in more effort. Traders have to distinguish between passive intervention to absorb 
foreign inflows, and active intervention. Their support to policy will be reduced, 
                                                           
14 This occurs if small variations in each player’s payoffs, known only to that player himself, determine 
the probability other players give to his adopting a particular strategy (Harsanyi, 1973). 
  22together with their ability to take strategic advantage of policy as in combination 2. 
FX markets are dominated by bilateral trades and learning takes place from order 
flow. 
Since the game brings out the effect of individual decisions and strategic interactions 
it can be used as a benchmark to analyze actual policy choices. It demonstrates the 
sensitivity of outcomes to monetary policy—and loss from non-optimal policy.  
 
3. Analytical narrative 
The analysis in section 3 gives useful insights on Indian post-reform macroeconomic 
episodes, and explains the stylized facts identified below. But in applying it to actual 
events, political and psychological factors have also to be taken into account.  
 
A benchmark real effective exchange rate (REER) was set after the devaluations of 
the early nineties, in order to maintain a competitive real exchange rate, encourage 
exports, and allow absorption of excess labour. But the nominal exchange rate showed 
bursts of high volatility
15 following periods when it was almost static. The response 
was a sharp rise in interest rates, which triggered an industrial recession and sustained 
it over 1997-2001. Indian interest rate volatility has exceeded exchange rate volatility 
for much of the nineties. Limited exchange rate volatility is easier to hedge than 
interest rate volatility, which has a deeper impact particularly when bank loans are the 
dominant mode of finance. Since the reliance on bank debt is high in an EME, sharp 
interest rate volatility delivers a severe shock to the financial system. The impact of 
interest rates rose significantly in the post-reform period. Although the volatility of 
exchange and nominal interest rates rose post-reform that of real interest rates fell, as 
administrative rigidities were reduced and markets freed. 
 
An analysis of the pattern of macroeconomic volatility across four pre- and post 
reform, high and low growth periods (Goyal, 2005), shows that although post reform 
foreign financial inflows, measured by the surplus on the capital account rose, their 
volatility fell. The volatility of the current account deficit (CAD), however, rose, 
                                                           
15 Detailed means, volatilities, and correlations are available in a project report (Goyal, 2005). The 
analysis in this section is based on various bi-annual monetary policy statements issued in April and 
October every year by the RBI, speeches by RBI governors and data available on the RBI’s website 
www.rbi.org.in and on Goyal (2002, 2004, 2005). 
  23suggesting that policy was magnifying the volatility of the inflows, and hindering 
their absorption. The CAD measures the actual absorption of foreign savings allowing 
domestic investment to exceed domestic savings
16. Although their trend was stable, 
short-term fluctuations of foreign portfolio inflows did contribute to exchange rate 
volatility. 
 
Reversals after a period of fixed exchange rates caused over-reaction by market 
players as well as policy makers.  Policy makers have traditionally regarded traders in 
Indian markets as prone to destabilizing speculative behavior
17, but poor market 
design and predictable one-way movements in exchange rates contributed to such 
behavior. Recent experience suggests credible public announcements from the CB can 
help to focus expectations
18. Although some agricultural liberalization and falling 
world food prices did reduce the political pressures that had raised food support prices 
and inflation, exchange rate policy was not systematically used to moderate the effect 
of the typical EME supply shocks: oil price shocks and failure of rains. Since the CB 
followed combination 2 its perception was that markets create volatility.  
The adjusting peg type of exchange rate regime followed led to a sharp defensive rise 
in interest rates after shocks. This overreaction amplified volatility. In our model, low 
interest elasticities imply v*1 is low, if there is a perception that interest elasticities are 
lower than they actually are, it would make v1 < v*1. Interest rates were largely 
administered and had been only recently freed; interest elasticities were thought to be 
low. The impact of reforms on elasticities, in particular the impact of the interest rate 
on consumer spending, was not yet fully understood. In addition, political pressures 
made w, the weight given to inflation in the loss function, high. Although the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) had greater autonomy after the reforms, it was still not fully 
                                                           
16 FX reserves rose to 140 billion US dollars in 2005, compared to a paltry 5 billion in 1990-91. 30 
billion dollars were accumulated in just 18 months over January 2002 to August 2003.  Arbitrage 
occurred at the short end since Indian short real rates were kept higher than US rates. 
17 This has often caused great trauma to traders and to certain communities that specialize in trade. See 
Hardgrove (2004) for a study of the Indian Marwari community, their self-understanding and sense of 
identity. They were said to be gamblers but for example, the traditional gambling on the rains actually 
served to hedge against income loss. Political rhetoric even equated foodgrain traders to the rats who 
eat grains and deserve to be shot. 
18 An example from Indian markets was the “Manic Monday” on May 17
th, 2004, due to unexpected 
election results. Stock markets crashed and had to be shut down. The RBI made a public announcement 
on its website that it was ready to sell FX and to provide liquidity as required. The availability of the 
window meant it was not required. Since each player knew that the other knew that liquidity was 
available there was no need for a panic rush to be the first to draw a limited stock. 
  24independent of the ministry of finance, which conveys the political pressures. The 
fiscal deficit was thought to be large. There were doubts about the durability of capital 
inflows and fears of a possible reversal, which would have implied a shock to the risk 
premium. Finally, risk aversion or the fear of being caught in policy combination 3 
pushed the RBI to adopt combination 2 in Figure 1.  
Pre-reform monetary policy followed a money supply targeting approach. But after 
the credit squeeze had a persistent effect on the level and term structure of interest 
rates the RBI shifted to a multiple indicator approach. A new RBI Governor, Bimal 
Jalan, demonstrated, through staggered placement of government debt, that it was 
possible for interest rates to come down despite high fiscal deficits. But there were 
reversals during periods of exchange rate volatility, sometimes induced by 
fluctuations in foreign capital inflows. The last such episode occurred, from mid-May 
to early August 2000. The RBI had committed to preventing excess volatility of the 
rupee (Jalan, 2003). A number of short-term supply shocks also occurred and as our 
model implies, monetary tightening in the presence of supply shocks sustained the 
slowdown.   
 
Policy committed to a soft interest rate regime, since the late nineties, but steady 
softening of nominal interest rates occurred only after February 2001, as world interest 
rates fell. The liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) implemented around that time helped 
fine-tune domestic liquidity and short-term interest rates drifted downwards. The 
absence of a reversal since 2000, contributed to an upswing in activity, as benign 
markets expectations strengthened. Bursts of high volatility no longer occurred in 
exchange rates. The RBI followed policy combination 1 (Figure 1) only after 2001, 
whereas over 1996-2000 it repeatedly reverted to combination 2. It followed 
combination 1 by chance more than conscious design, because world interest rates fell. 
Still, Indian interest rates still did not fall as much as international and the interest 
differential widened.  
The analysis performs well on the Bates et. al. (1998) criteria for assessing analytical 
narratives: 
1.  The modeling assumptions are chosen to closely fit our EME’s structure, and 
the observed pattern of shocks. Estimation and structural VAR based tests 
  25(Goyal and Pujari, 2005) support the critical assumption of long-run elastic 
supply.  
2.  The results are derived from the logic of the model. Policy choices depend on 
parameter values, objective functions, and the institutional environment.  
3.  Parameter values used in the analysis and in the simulations are validated 
through estimation. The analysis is able to explain actual Indian 
macroeconomic policy choices that led to an endogenous amplification of 
supply shocks. The analysis serves as a tool of empirical discovery by pointing 
out the fine gradations of monetary policy with their very different effects. 
4.  The analysis subsumes different explanations. Both demand and supply side is 
modeled. Macroeconomic outcomes are traced to micro decisions. It allows 
for the possibility of a high deficit and excessive credit creation raising 
inflation and therefore interest rates, but then shows why, given structure and 
shocks, opposite effects are more likely.  Both money supply and cost-push 
effects on inflation are modeled.  
5.  The results generalize to countries that share the crucial feature of high 




4. Policy implications 
Although the likelihood of the optimal combination 1 has risen, with higher interest 
elasticities and market deepening, supporting institutional changes that reduce the risk 
of outcome 3 would help to enforce 1. For the RBI to keep v1 = v*1, restraint on 
revenue deficits and populist expenditure is necessary. Political and institutional 
features result in fiscal-monetary coordination such that the economy remains on an 
elastic stretch of the aggregate supply curve. Fiscal populism pushes monetary 
authorities towards conservatism in order to reduce inflationary expectations. But 
since the populism raises inefficiencies and therefore costs it shifts up the supply 
curve, while monetary tightening reduces demand, resulting in a large negative effect 
on output for little gain in reduced inflation. The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget 
                                                           
19 See Goyal and Jha (2004) for a systematic comparison of macropolicy choices in China and India 
based on the similarities of their labor market structure and the differences in their political structure. 
Without democratic pressure China was able to follow a stop-go policy with large swings in inflation. 
The suggested exchange rate regime would help it to moderate these and deepen its financial and FX 
markets. 
  26Management (FRBM) Act 2003 will put some restraint on the fiscal laxity, but it does 
not really address the need to change the composition of government expenditure 
away from consumption and towards investment in infrastructure and human capital, 
and reduce waste. However, more openness may aid monetary policy to break out of 
past traps.  
 
Liberalization of the FX market had just begun in 1995, and markets still have a 
limited role in the determination of the exchange rate, and the interbank trade share is 
low by world standards. Even so, the analysis suggests that with policy combination 
1, fundamentals strengthen and markets do the work. Intervention or signalling is 
additional ammunition and would be respected, because the RBI has such large 
reserves and size in the market. Since with high growth there is a continual inflow of 
foreign capital and the RBI keeps intervening to accumulate reserves, achieving v*1 is 
just a matter of finding the right balance between accumulation and sterilization. As 
long as fundamentals improve, markets help CBs achieve their objectives
20, while 
overreaction is moderated, and the risk premium lowered. There is evidence that while 
currency crises adversely affect trade, limited fluctuation in exchange rates do not have a 
large effect on trade (McKenzie 2004). If limited volatility helps prevent crises and 
lower interest rates, it may even benefit trade. 
 
With forward looking agents a short-run tradeoff between inflation and output 
variability arises only if inflation is positive due to a cost shock, since excess demand 
can be removed without output cost. Forward-looking monetary policy can use its 
knowledge of structure to abort the inflationary process. During a catch-up period of 
rapid productivity growth potential output exceeds output. If as supply shocks are the 
dominant source of inflation and deviations of output from potential harm welfare, 
optimal policy would aim to achieve an inflation target only over the medium-term by 
which time temporary supply shocks have petered out, or been countered by exchange 
rate policy, changes in tax rates, or improvement in efficiencies. Inflation targeting 
itself will prevent the inflationary wage-price expectations from setting in that can 
imply a permanent upward shift in the supply curve from a temporary supply shock. 
Monetary policy has to tighten only if there is excess demand.  
                                                           
20 Ito and Park (2004) find an intermediate regime, such as a basket band regime, to be compatible with 
other monetary policy goals, such as inflation targeting, under a variety of shocks. 
  27Svensson (2000) points out that the lag from the exchange rate to consumer prices is 
the shortest. If two-way movement of the nominal exchange rate is synchronized with 
temporary supply shocks, and the exchange rate appreciates when there is a negative 
supply shock, it would lower the prices of intermediate and food prices. The 
competitive pressure would abate political pressures to raise farm support prices, and 
then to subsidize consumers or otherwise intervene to repress inflation resulting from 
rising nominal wages. This differs from fixing the exchange rate to bring down high 
levels of inflation, which often leads to real appreciation and ends in a crisis, as in 
Latin American exchange-based stabilization episodes. Two-way movement only pre-
empts the effect of temporary supply shocks on the domestic price-wage process.  
The growth revival in 2003 demonstrated the efficacy of lower interest rates and 
higher spending on infrastructure. Building in a rule whereby there is an automatic 
announced response to an expected supply shock would avoid the tendency to do 
nothing until it becomes necessary to over-react. But such forward-looking 
macroeconomic policy requires good data and estimation of macro relationships. 
5. Conclusion  
We show in a simple open economy macromodel, calibrated to the typical institutions 
and shocks of an emerging market economy, that a monetary stimulus preceding a 
temporary supply shock can abort inflation at minimum output cost, since of 
exchange rate appreciation, accompanying a fall in interest rates and rise in output. 
The policy helps to maintain some exchange rate flexibility while permitting a 
counter-cyclical interest rate. The optimal policy creates correct incentives for FX 
traders who support it, but since this can shade into lax monetary policy under 
uncertainty, with the worst outcomes, CB’s tend to prefer the conservative policy, 
which is not supported by markets. Model and parameter uncertainty, status-quoism, 
risk-aversion, and the lack of supporting fiscal policy is the reason the opposite policy 
combination is often chosen. With optimal policy CB intervention in FX markets may 
not be required at all, or may serve as a signal. The policy is compatible with political 
constraints, but further institutional changes and binding rules can make it self-
enforcing, deepening markets and coordinating them with macroeconomic policy 
towards optimal outcomes. The analysis is used to examine Indian macropolicy 
decisions. The economy did well when policy approached the optimal combination.   
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Limited volatility in exchange rates improves the structure of incentives making it 
possible to achieve four objectives. First, stimulate the real sector through a real 
exchange rate that follows its trend competitive value. Second, smooth nominal 
interest rates and suit them to the domestic cycle and towards achieving long-run 
external balance; so that eventual current account surpluses follow initial deficits. 
Third, an appreciation is an antidote to price shocks coming from food, oil and other 
intermediate inputs, which are the typical temporary supply shocks the economy 
faces.  For example, when the underlying trend is that of nominal appreciation, a 
steeper short-term appreciation can reduce inflation, thus allowing interest rates to fall 
and contributing to control of inflation.  The fourth benefit is stability in the external 
sector, and a fall in the likelihood of currency crises. Limited two-way movement of 
the exchange rate, creates incentives to hedge, reduces noise trader entry, and 
contributes to the deepening of FX markets. 
 
Further work can compare consumer price and domestic inflation targeting, explore 
CB secrecy and commitment, and derive aggregate demand and supply from 
microfoundations in the context of the EME modeled. 
 
Appendix I 
The value of optimal v*1 is  ( ) ( )
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TABLE 4: STATIONARITY TESTS FOR QUARTERLY SERIES 
VARIABLE ADF  TEST  PPERRON  TEST 
Cmrqr -2.99**(.0350)  -2.872**(.0487) 
Dip -7.810***(.000)  -14.231***(.000) 
Dwpi -5.671***(.000)  -5.669***(.000) 
Dcpi -5.210***(.000)  -5.156***(.000) 
Dz -5.580***(.000)  -5.589***(.000) 
dgdpq_pot -6.539***(.0000)  -16.689***(.000) 
Realcmrqr -2.979**(.0369)  -2.812*(.0566) 
 
TABLE 5: STATIONARITY TESTS FOR MONTHLY SERIES 
VARIABLE ADF  TEST  PPERRON  TEST 
Cmr -5.464***(.000)  -5.407***(.000) 
diip_t -17.097***(.000)  -17.253***(.000) 
dwpi_t -9.856***(.000)  -9.807***(.000) 
dcpi_t -6.799***(.000)  -6.678***(.000) 
Duscpi -7.923***(.000)  -7.532***(.000) 
Doil -9.660***(.000)  -9.631***(.000) 
Reallr -6.985***(.000)  -6.832***(.000) 
Diippot -17.097***(.000)  -17.253***(.000) 
Dz -8.134***(.000)  -8.027***(.000) 
Notes:  1. Superscript ***,**,* indicate 1%, 5%, 10% significance level respectively 
 2. Figures in parenthesis indicates Mackinnon P-value  
 3. All the regression equations include one lagged difference term and constant 
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